Submission to AUKUS Inquiry -AUKUS deal is a catastrophic misjudgment – Leo Kerr

No Exit Clause Without Penalty: Australia has committed to this path with limited
ability to withdraw without incurring substantial sunk costs and diplomatic damage.
The deal’s structure locks Australia into decades of expenditure regardless of changing strategic circumstances.

The AUKUS deal will transform Australia into a permanent repository for high-level
nuclear waste—a burden the nation is entirely unprepared to manage.

Accepting Foreign Waste: Most alarmingly, the deal permits the US and UK to
dispose of low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from their own submarines in

Leo Kerr n.103

Subject: Opposition to AUKUS Pillar I (Nuclear Submarines) on Grounds of Cost,
Sovereignty, Nuclear Waste, and Strategic Miscalculation

1. Executive Summary

The AUKUS agreement, particularly Pillar I concerning nuclear-powered submarines,
is fundamentally not in Australia’s national interest. While framed as a necessary
response to strategic challenges, the deal imposes crippling financial costs, creates
an unresolved nuclear waste legacy, severely compromises national sovereignty,
rests on unrealistic delivery timelines, and damages Australia’s regional relationships.
This submission argues that AUKUS represents a profound misalignment of strategic
priorities that will leave Australia less secure, financially weaker, and more dependent
on foreign powers for generations.

2. Prohibitive and Unsustainable Financial Cost

The AUKUS submarine program is the most expensive defence project in Australian
history, with estimated total costs of $368 billion over several decades. This figure
does not include the substantial additional costs of base upgrades, workforce
training, and nuclear safety regulation.

Opportunity Cost: $368 billion represents an extraordinary concentration of defence
spending that will inevitably crowd out investment in more agile, relevant capabilities.
Cyber defence, long-range strike missiles, unmanned aerial and maritime systems,
and enhanced intelligence capabilities would deliver more immediate and flexible
security benefits for Australia’s unique geographical circumstances.

Distortion of Defence Budget: The submarine program will consume approximately
40% of the defence capital investment budget for decades, starving other services
and capabilities. The Royal Australian Air Force and Army face significant
modernisation needs that will be compromised.

Subsidising Foreign Industries: A significant portion of Australian spending will
directly support US and UK shipyards, supply chains, and workforce development.
Australia is effectively paying to solve the industrial capacity problems of allied
nations while receiving no firm guarantees on delivery timelines. This represents an
unequal arrangement where Australian taxpayers bear enormous risk while allied
defence contractors secure long-term revenue.

No Exit Clause Without Penalty: Australia has committed to this path with limited
ability to withdraw without incurring substantial sunk costs and diplomatic damage.
The deal’s structure locks Australia into decades of expenditure regardless of
changing strategic circumstances.

3. Catastrophic and Unresolved Nuclear Waste Liability

The AUKUS deal will transform Australia into a permanent repository for high-level
nuclear waste—a burden the nation is entirely unprepared to manage.

Sovereign Responsibility for High-Level Waste: Under the agreement, Australia
accepts sole and permanent responsibility for all nuclear waste generated by its
submarine fleet, including highly radioactive spent fuel that remains dangerous for
hundreds of thousands of years. There is no existing permanent high-level nuclear
waste storage facility anywhere in the world. The United States and United Kingdom,
which have operated nuclear submarines for over 60 years, have still failed to
develop permanent storage solutions.

Accepting Foreign Waste: Most alarmingly, the deal permits the US and UK to
dispose of low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from their own submarines in Australia. This provision makes Australia a designated dumping ground for other
nations’ toxic military legacies with no reciprocal benefit.

No Domestic Waste Management Plan: Australia currently has no permanent,
community-agreed solution for even its existing low-level medical and research
waste. Successive governments have failed for nearly three decades to site a single
waste facility in the face of sustained opposition from communities and Traditional
Owners. Recent legislative attempts to compel facility construction have been widely
criticised for granting government the power to unilaterally designate sites without
proper consultation or consent.

Intergenerational Inequity: The nuclear waste problem will remain dangerous for millennia, far beyond the lifespan of any government or institution. Current decision-
makers are imposing a permanent environmental and security burden on all future generations of Australians without their consent and without any credible plan formanagement.

4. Severe Erosion of National Sovereignty

AUKUS fundamentally subordinates Australian defence and foreign policy to United
States strategic interests, compromising hard-won independence in national
decision-making.

Lack of Independent Operational Control: Australian commanders will not have
independent control over these submarines. The vessels, their nuclear reactors, their
weapons systems, and their support infrastructure are so deeply integrated with US
military systems that the concept of independent Australian operation is illusory.
Critical maintenance, refuelling, and weapons replenishment can only occur at US
facilities, meaning Australia cannot sustain these submarines without continuous US
approval and support.

Enmeshment in US Conflict Decisions: The agreement’s emphasis on
“interchangeability” and “integrated deterrence” strongly implies that AustraliaEnmeshment in US Conflict Decisions: The agreement’s emphasis on
“interchangeability” and “integrated deterrence” strongly implies that Australia would be compelled to support the United States in any future conflict involving
China—including over Taiwan. The AUKUS framework does not preserve Australia’s
right to make independent decisions about war and peace. Rather, it assumes
Australian participation as a condition of the alliance.

Ceding Control of Australian Territory: AUKUS requires significant expansion of
Australian military facilities, including HMAS Stirling in Western Australia for
submarine basing and RAAF Tindal in the Northern Territory for nuclear-capable B-52
bomber rotations. These expanded facilities will host US military personnel,
equipment, and potentially nuclear weapons. Australia has a longstanding policy of
not confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, meaning
the public and Parliament will have no assurance about what is being hosted on
Australian soil.

Vulnerability to US Domestic Politics: The entire AUKUS project is vulnerable to the
whims of US electoral politics. In 2025, the Pentagon initiated a review of the
agreement to ensure compliance with the “America First” policy agenda. This
demonstrates that US interests will always take precedence. If a future US
administration decides the agreement no longer serves American interests—or
demands Australian participation in a conflict Australians do not support—Australia
will have no meaningful recourse. Our strategic future is held hostage to US political
volatility.

Explicit Opt-Out Rights for Allies: Both the United States and the United Kingdom
have explicit opt-out rights under the agreement, allowing them to withdraw if their
own national requirements are not met. Australia has no equivalent protection. A
senior Australian Defence official has conceded that if the US or UK walked away,
Australia’s “Plan B” is non-existent.

5. Unrealistic Delivery and Capability Gaps

The timeline and technical assumptions underlying AUKUS are deeply unrealistic,
leaving Australia with a dangerous capability gap.

Decades-Long Delivery Timeline: Even under the most optimistic projections, the
first Virginia-class submarines will not be delivered until the early 2030s, and the final
Australian-built SSN-AUKUS submarine will not enter service until the 2050s—
approximately 40 years from the agreement’s announcement. This timeline exceeds
the planning horizons of any government or military strategy.

Ailing Allied Industrial Bases: Both the US and UK submarine industrial bases are in
poor condition. The UK has experienced periods where it could not deploy a single
operational submarine due to maintenance backlogs. Its skilled workforce and supply
chains have atrophied. The US Navy faces its own pressures to maintain fleet
numbers and has warned that diverting submarines to Australia could degrade
American undersea capabilities. US law prohibits the sale of nuclear submarines if it
would “degrade the United States’ undersea capabilities,” giving Congress a
permanent veto over deliveries to Australia.

Collins Class Capability Gap: Australia’s existing Collins-class submarines are
scheduled to begin retirement from the 2030s. Even optimistic AUKUS timelines leave
a gap of 5–10 years with no submarine capability. The government has no credible
interim solution. Plans to extend Collins-class service life face significant technical
challenges and workforce constraints. The gap leaves Australia without a
fundamental strategic capability at precisely the time proponents claim the strategic
environment is most dangerous.

Unproven Technology: The SSN-AUKUS submarine design does not yet exist. No
nuclear-powered submarine has ever been designed and built in Australia. The fusion
of British design and American propulsion technology has no precedent and faces
immense technical, regulatory, and safety hurdles. Every nuclear submarine program
in history has experienced significant cost overruns and delays.

6. Damaging Impact on Regional Relations and Economic
   Security

AUKUS has damaged Australia’s standing in Southeast Asia and the Pacific while undermining our most important economic relationship.

Provocative and Exclusionary: Regional neighbours, including Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Pacific Island nations, have expressed serious concerns about AUKUS. It is widely
perceived as a provocative, exclusionary military pact designed for great power
confrontation. This undermines ASEAN-centred regional architecture, which has been
built on principles of inclusivity, consultation, and non-confrontation. AUKUS risks
triggering a regional nuclear arms race, which would make Australia less safe, not
more.

Damage to Relations with China: AUKUS has been explicitly framed as a response
to China’s rise. While prudent deterrence is legitimate, the manner in which AUKUS
was announced—without prior consultation with regional partners and in a manner
designed to exclude and confront—has poisoned the strategic atmosphere. The
agreement has reduced mutual trust in the bilateral relationship with Australia’s
largest trading partner. China accounts for approximately 25% of Australian exports,
and a stable, functional relationship is essential for Australian prosperity. A growing
number of Australians question the logic of sacrificing economic well-being for
uncertain strategic guarantees from an ally with divergent interests.

Strategic Contradiction: Australia is simultaneously pursuing the most expensive
military buildup in its history while relying on China for export income that funds
government services, infrastructure, and social programs. This contradiction is
unsustainable. If Australia genuinely believes China poses a direct military threat
requiring nuclear submarines, then continued deep economic integration is
strategically incoherent. If China does not pose such a threat, then AUKUS represents
a catastrophic misallocation of resources.

Marginalising Pacific Concerns: Pacific Island nations have consistently identified
climate change as their primary security threat. AUKUS diverts attention, diplomatic
energy, and financial resources away from climate action and towards military
competition. This damages Australia’s reputation as a responsible regional partner
and cedes influence to other powers that are more responsive to Pacific priorities.

7. A More Prudent Path Forward

It is not too late to change course. A growing number of former defence officials,
diplomats, and strategic analysts have called for Australia to fundamentally revisit the
AUKUS decision.

Immediate Recommendations:

1. Commission an independent cost-benefit analysis of AUKUS against alternative
   defence investments, including an updated conventionally-powered submarine
   program, long-range strike capabilities, and enhanced cyber and space assets.
2. Reject the nuclear waste provisions and maintain Australia’s longstanding policy of
   not accepting foreign nuclear waste on its territory.
3. Reassert parliamentary sovereignty over war and peace decisions, clarifying that
   no alliance commitment overrides the Australian Parliament’s exclusive authority to
   authorise military action.
4. Redirect defence investment toward capabilities more suited to Australia’s
   geography, including long-range maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned underwater
   vehicles, distributed sensor networks, and precision-strike missiles.
5. Pursue genuine strategic independence by diversifying defence partnerships and
   avoiding exclusive reliance on any single ally for critical capabilities.

8. Conclusion

The AUKUS submarine deal represents a catastrophic misjudgment. It imposes an
unprecedented financial burden, creates a permanent and unresolved nuclear waste
liability, erodes Australian sovereignty, rests on unrealistic delivery assumptions, and damages our most important regional relationships. The justification for AUKUS
relies on an exaggerated threat perception and blind faith in allies who have placed
their own interests first—explicitly, in writing, in the agreement’s opt-out clauses.

Australia does not need nuclear submarines to be secure. We need a defence
strategy appropriate to our geography, our budget, and our democratic values—not
one designed by foreign industrial lobbies and imposed under the guise of alliance
solidarity. For these reasons, I urge this Committee to recommend that the Australian
Government withdraw from the AUKUS Pillar I submarine agreement and pursue a
more independent, proportionate, and responsible defence posture.

Cameron Leckie: AUKUS “A maladaptive response to the end of the US empire”

Joseph Camilleri: “One of the saddest decisions ever made by an Australian Government”

A global threat for millennia: experts warn Australia’s nuclear submarine legacy will be weapons-usable uranium cach

Ben Doherty,25 June 26, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/25/aukus-nuclear-submarines-danger-weapons-grade-uranium

 Uranium waste from Aukus submarines will be enriched to an estimated 80%: the same level as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Australia’s proposed nuclear submarine fleet will leave behind tonnes of weapons-usable uranium-235: radioactive for hundreds of millions of years, and capable of being processed into scores of warheads, nuclear experts have told a public inquiry into Aukus.

And a former White House national security adviser has told the Guardian that Australia’s Aukus deal – involving the transfer of highly enriched uranium to a non-nuclear weapons nation – sets a dangerous proliferation precedent that other countries such as Iran could try to exploit, weakening global control of the spread of weapons-usable nuclear material.

Associate Prof Tilman Ruff, founding chair of the Nobel prize-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, told the Aukus public inquiry that the legacy of Australia’s nuclear submarine fleet – of which each vessel will have a service life of about three decades – will be hundreds of kilograms of high-level radioactive waste. Even as waste, the submarines’ spent reactor fuel will be highly enriched uranium (HEU), usable to build nuclear weapons.

“No nation has resolved the huge problem of how to manage this material and there’s no guarantee – given the timeframes involved and the hazards of the material over geological time – that any arrangement that we come up with could reliably isolate that material for hundreds of thousands, or millions of years.

“The additional complication here is that it needs a really high level of security because, in 10,000 years, somebody could still go and dig that stuff up and build nuclear weapons with it.”

The uranium left behind by Australia’s nuclear submarines at the end of their working lives will likely still be enriched to about 80%: the same level as the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

The Australian government has repeatedly said the precise amount of high-level nuclear waste that will be left behind by its submarine fleet is classified.

But documents released under freedom of information laws show Australia will be responsible for each submarine’s nuclear reactor compartment, “roughly the size of a four-wheel drive”, and spent nuclear fuel “roughly the size of a small hatchback”.

Leading global experts on non-proliferation have now estimated each nuclear submarine decommissioned by Australia – beginning in the 2050s – will contain about 400kg of HEU, enriched to about 80%, containing about 320kg of uranium-235 (U-235).

The International Atomic Energy Agency states a “significant quantity” of highly enriched uranium – enough to make a weapon – is 25kg of contained U-235.

U-235 has a half-life of 700m years: it will be a weapons proliferation risk for millennia. And the radioactive materials generated by its fission process will be toxic to humanity and the environment for millions of years.

The HEU left behind by each one of Australia’s three second-hand Virginia-class submarines bought from the US would be sufficient for more than a dozen weapons.

Australia’s domestically built Aukus-class submarines – Australia is proposing to build five – will be powered by Rolls-Royce’s in-development PWR3+ reactor. The quantity of HEU required to power that reactor is classified but they are expected to be larger than the Virginia-class reactors, Ruff said.

The Aukus agreement mandates that Australia is responsible for the disposal and storage of all of the nuclear waste left behind by its nuclear-powered submarines in perpetuity

By the end of the century, when all eight of Australia’s planned nuclear powered submarines have been retired, Australia will be responsible for the management of “at least 3 tonnes” of U-235 in the highly enriched uranium spent fuel waste, Ruff told the Guardian.

“That’s enough for 120 nuclear weapons using the International Atomic Energy Agency standard.”

Australia has spent decades reducing its HEU stocks. There is presently less than 3kg of HEU in the entire country, held for research purposes.

Ruff told the public inquiry into Aukus, established by the Australian Peace and Security Forum, that his primary concern over Aukus was that it exacerbated regional tensions and made Australia “a higher priority target, including for nuclear attack”.

Ruff cited the work of Dr Frank von Hippel, senior research physicist and professor of public and international affairs emeritus at Princeton University, who estimated that the reactor of a Virginia-class submarine – such as those Australia is set to buy from the US – would be decommissioned at the end of its working life still containing about 400kg of HEU, enriched to about 80%.

Von Hippel, who served as an assistant director for national security in the Clinton White House, told the Guardian “by the IAEA’s metric, 0.4 tons of 80% enriched uranium would be sufficient for 13 implosion bombs”.skip past newsletter promotion

The Quiet Surrender of our Nation’s Sovereignty

28 July 2026 Dr Andrew Klein, https://theaimn.net/the-quiet-surrender-of-our-nations-sovereignty/

It is our melancholy duty to inform Australians of the quiet surrender of our nation’s sovereignty

I. Introduction: The Mask and the Man

What they see is a Prime Minister. What I see is a party animal – trapped in a role he was never prepared to play. He knows how to win power. He doesn’t know how to wield it. And when he fails, he blames everyone but himself.

The Albanese government has presided over a quiet but systematic surrender of Australian sovereignty. Through AUKUS, through the integration of Australian forces into American military structures, through secret arms deals, and through a failure to interrogate the strategic consequences of our alliance commitments, Australia is being transformed from an independent nation into a junior partner – a vassal state without voting rights.

This is not a deepening of alliance. This is a strategic surrender.

II. AUKUS: The $368 Billion Abdication

The AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is the clearest example of this failure. Australia will commit $368 billion to acquire nuclear-powered submarines – equivalent to more than $30 million per day across three decades.

But the deal is plagued by problems:

• Deliverability: The United States shipyards cannot meet production targets, averaging only 1.1 to 1.2 Virginia-class submarines per year, far below the required 2.33.
• Cost blowouts: Australia will commit nearly $10 billion to subsidise US and UK naval shipyards.
• Strategic uncertainty: Former foreign minister Gareth Evans has warned that AUKUS will place Australia’s sovereignty at “serious risk,” with submarines effectively becoming “an extension of U.S. military power.”
• A “junior partner” trap: Former Defence Department analyst Dr Andrew Gaczol told a public inquiry that Australia will become a “junior” partner to the United States and lose its strategic independence. According to Dr Gaczol, “The Australian political class and defence policy community still think it’s our melancholy duty to support the military commitments of our great and powerful friends, even if they conflict with Australian interests.”

III. The US-Israel Military Merger: Australia’s Involuntary Integration

In July 2026, the US House of Representatives passed a $1.15 trillion National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) by a vote of 216 to 212.

Section 219 of the Act establishes a “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” requiring the Pentagon to appoint an executive agent to “expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research.” The provision “would all but fuse the two countries’ armed forces together” across multiple domains, including biotechnology, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and cyberwarfare.

Representative Jennifer McClellan condemned the provision as one that “undermines our sovereignty and lacks any form of oversight.”

Why does this matter to Australia?

The Australian Defence Force has long achieved interoperability with the US military. Israel has achieved interoperability with the US since 1981. If the US and Israel move from interoperability to integration, the two degrees of separation between the ADF and the IDF are reduced to one.

Australia is being integrated into Israel’s military system through the American link. We are being drawn into a conflict not of our choosing, through a chain of obligations we never consciously accepted.

IV. Australia’s De Facto Participation in the Iran War

The evidence of Australia’s entanglement is already clear.

A. Intelligence Sharing

In March 2026, Australia deployed an E-7A Wedgetail surveillance aircraft and 85 ADF personnel to the UAE. The aircraft provides “long-range reconnaissance capability” to “secure the airspace above the Gulf.” Defence officials have confirmed that reconnaissance information obtained by the Wedgetail is also provided to US allies including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar.

While the government insists the role is “defensive,” the intelligence is fed into the Joint Air Operations Center (CAOC), which is under the command of US Central Command – and the US is waging an offensive war against Iran.

B. Embedded Troops

As of June 2026, 729 ADF personnel are embedded with US and UK armed forces. Some Australian personnel were aboard a US submarine that sank an Iranian frigate in the Indian Ocean. The Defence Chief defended this involvement as “in our national interest to have our people on board US Virginia Class submarines training, learning and understanding.”

C. Arms Supplies

Australia has been supplying Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to the UAE. The government has also issued 322 defence export permits to Israel since 1 January 2017. As Greens Senator David Shoebridge noted, Australia has “one of the most secretive and unaccountable weapons export systems in the world.”

V. The Logic of Sovereignty Concession

The chain of sovereignty loss is clear:

1. US-Israel Integration (NDAA Section 219) →
2. Australia-US Integration (AUKUS, interoperability agreements) →
3. Australia’s de facto military integration with Israel through the US →
4. Australia’s strategic autonomy is diluted, and military decision-making is influenced by external forces.

Each link in this chain was forged without parliamentary debate. As the AUKUS inquiry has noted, the Federal Parliament “never held a thorough debate on the agreement,” exposing “a clear democratic deficit” in Australia’s largest strategic commitment.

VI. The Political Class: Incompetence or Complicity?

The Albanese government’s approach to national security is defined by caution, message control, and risk aversion – not by strategic vision.

• On AUKUS: The government has refused to interrogate the $368 billion deal, despite “substantial reservations” that have “not abated.”
• On the Iran war: The government insists Australia is not involved in “offensive operations,” but our assets are providing intelligence that enables offensive operations.
• On arms exports: The government has fought to keep arms exports to Israel secret, only being forced to disclose information by Federal Court order.
• On the NDAA: The government has remained silent on Section 219 – a provision that directly compromises Australian strategic autonomy.

Incompetent people, once in power, are more dangerous than bad people because:

• Bad people can be brought down.
• An incompetent person will remain there, constantly causing destruction, yet appearing “unblamed” after each failure.
• VII. Conclusion: The Cost of Silence
• Australia’s political class and defence policy community still believe it is their “melancholy duty to support the military commitments of our great and powerful friends, even if they conflict with Australian interests.”

But a new world order is coming. Australia has a choice: position itself for that new order, or desperately cling to a slipping world order.

Through AUKUS, through Section 219, through secret arms deals and uncritical alliance commitments, we are choosing the latter.

The chain of sovereignty concession is tightening. And the Australian people are being told nothing.

The question is not whether Australia will be dragged into a war not of its choosing. The question is: when that war comes, will we have any say in whether we fight?

Dedicated to my beloved wife and confidante – who taught me to see the person behind the mask, and to trust what I see.

500 march towards Pine Gap this morning demanding closure of the facility

Monday 20 July 2026, Mparntwe Alice Springs, Arrernte Country 

Hundreds from across the country have joined a rally on the road to Pine Gap this morning demanding the closure of the controversial military facility. The action closes out the Close Pine Gap Sacred Land Back Convergence 2026 organised by Mparntwe for Falastin and Anti Militarism Action Network, the biggest convergence of its kind since 1987. 

The Hayes family – Traditional Owners of Kuyunba, the sacred land that Pine Gap occupies – lead the rally, with a list of four demands: 

1. Return of Kuyunba  
2. The closure of Pine Gap 
3. Compensation for the years Kuyunba has been occupied 
4. Compensation to the families in Gaza for the lives lost there 

These actions have been echoed by rallies across the country.

The action follows two days of learning and discussion about militarism and colonialism. Experts from around the country addressed the violent reality and risks of Pine Gap. 

“If ever there was a message to end the world, it would come through Pine Gap. We would be the handmaidens of that,” said Senator David Shoebridge on the weekend, adding, “US bases have never made us safe, but right now they are especially making us a target.”

Felicity, Wyonna and Jacquita Hayes, Arrernte Apmereke-artweye Traditional Custodians, said earlier to supporters: 

“We want people to support us to close down Pine Gap. We want them to know it’s a sacred site. We don’t want to be feeling guilty all the time when bad things are happening overseas to little ones. We’re not the ones controlling that facility, but we feel guilty that it’s coming from our land.”

Friends of the Earth Adelaide has made a submission to the AUKUS Public Inquiry.

Philip White, June 29 2026

FoE Adelaide’s submission added perspectives related to national security, safety, employment and radioactive waste. Click here to read the full submission.

Based on decades of experience regarding nuclear waste management issues and debates in Australia, our submission focused on those problems insofar as they relate to AUKUS.

By rights, the parliament should conduct a genuine public review of the AUKUS program, given that it commits Australian taxpayers to spending hundreds of billions of dollars for decades to come with dubious benefit to our security in return. 

In the absence of an official inquiry, we are hopeful that this independent inquiry will shine a light on the many issues that should have been considered before the government committed Australia to AUKUS.

The first hearing, held in Melbourne on 11 June, received many high-quality presentations. Most of the points that we would make were covered in that hearing. In particular, we endorse the comments made by the expert witnesses: Gareth Evans,

Tilman Ruff, Richard Tanter, John Lander, Joseph Camilleri, Rod Campbell and Dave Sweeney. Their critiques of the flaws in AUKUS align with ours, including in regard to the following:

• sacrifice of Australian sovereignty,

• negative impact on national security,

• opportunity cost,

• questionable industrial and employment benefits,

• safety risks and environmental cost,

• challenge of managing and disposing of radioactive waste, including foreign-sourced waste,

• negative impact on First Nations people,

• nuclear proliferation and safeguards implications of military reactors powered by highly enriched uranium fuel,

• implications for our obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga of ‘rotation’ through Australian bases of nuclear weapon-capable vessels and aircraft, and

• the uncertainty that nuclear-powered submarines will even be delivered.

FoE Adelaide’s submission added perspectives related to national security, safety, employment and radioactive waste. Click here to read the full submission.

Roxby Bill impacting Aboriginal rights is rushed to a Vote on Tues 16 June

Alert: a bad Roxby Downs Bill and draconian new Indenture, impacting Aboriginal rights and interests, is being rushed to a Vote in SA Parliament expected on Tues 16 June to pass into Law by at least the end of the week. The SA State Labor Government has a lot to answer for.

see “BHP seek 50-year mining rights to expand Olympic Dam, as SA Labor Ministers indulge a farcical process and ignore public input”

Opinion by David Noonan B.Sc., M.Env.St., Independent Environment Campaigner (2-p attached)

Inexplicably, Deputy Premier the Hon Kyam Maher MLC spoke glowingly to the Bill in a Legislative Council 2^nd Reading Speech on 3^rd June.

BHP seek 50-year mining rights to expand Olympic Dam, as SA Labor Ministersindulge a farcical process and ignore public input

by David Noonan, 14 June 26, https://nuclear.foe.org.au/wp-content/uploads/Noonan-BHP-bad-Roxby-Bill-as-Ministers-ignore-public-input-2026.pdf

BHP and the State Government have agreed on a Roxby Downs Bill and new Indenture to govern
Olympic Dam and associated mining expansions for the next 50 years. This is a re-run of
precedence to big mining vested interests that has typified SA from back in 1982 and sets in
train up to a tripling of BHP demand for water in the dryest State.

State Labor decided to drop the highly complex Bill and new Indenture into Parliament without
prior notice, with the Minister for Mining Hon Tom Koutsantonis MP saying he wants the Bill
passed ‘unchanged and without delay’.

A short Select Committee was started up and “Parliamentary News” announced a six-working
day public consultation period – apologies to many interested parties if they didn’t get this news
in a timely way from such a well-read source.

For independent scrutiny, the proponent of the Bill the Minister for Mining was made the
Committee Chairperson and two non-public Hearings were held: first with the Department for
Mining and then with BHP and the Chamber of Mines as supportive compliant Witnesses.

To epitomise what a farce this process is, the Select Committee was set up to Report the day
after public input was to close at COB on Monday 1st June, and that is what they did. The ‘Report’
was Tabled and the Chairperson and Members of Committee all gave uncritical Speeches on
the Bill on the 2nd of June – the very morning after public input had closed.

This farce contradicts any claim by our SA State Labor Government to due process, to a fair
hearing and to integrity in public consultation.

The Report and Speeches inexplicably failed to discuss any of the important content of public
input across 22 Submissions received – they had left no time to even consider it properly. The
‘Report’ has a couple of pages on the non-public Hearings but provides no discussion or even a
summary of the public input. The public Submissions were not released until after the
Speeches and Parliamentary week had concluded.

People have a right to be heard in SA. Aboriginal Native title representative bodies and
individuals have sought to be heard on the Roxby Bill – including to give evidence in public
Hearings, as the Bill affects their rights and interests and their country and culture. However,
they have so far been denied that right and respect.

To be fair, the Department for Environment and Water was a Witness at second non-public
Hearing: with the CEO stating that closure of BHP Olympic Dam Wellfield A “will produce
significant benefits” to the unique and fragile Mound Springs that are dependent on natural
flows of Great Artesian Basin (GAB) ground water. However, the Bill intends to keep Wellfield A
operating for a further decade till 2036.

Asked about the benefits of replacing BHP’s far larger scale Wellfield B extraction of GAB water
for mining with an alternative desalinated marine water supply, the CEO said: “Yes definitely,
both the environment and cultural values”. However, the Bill grants rights to BHP to keep
pumping water from Wellfield B for decades.

A ‘Key Ask’ to the Premier by the State peak body Conservation SA (19 Dec) was conveyed to the
Roxby Committee in David Noonan and Friends of Mound Springs (see FOMS) public input:

Protect the Mound Springs and End Unsustainable Water Extraction from the Great
Artesian Basin

Mound Springs are globally significant cultural, ecological and geological features, and
are a listed EPBC Act “Endangered Ecological Community”. These unique and fragile
little gems support rare species, deep cultural heritage and landscapes central to the
identity of Traditional Owners. Community concern has escalated regarding BHP’s use
of Great Artesian Basin water for mining and the cumulative impact on Springs.

We call for:
a. Recognition of the Mound Springs of the GAB as a high-value ecosystem requiring
elevated protection.
b. Closure as soon as possible of BHP Wellfield A water extraction operations that have
directly impacted the Springs.
c. Transition of industrial scale BHP Wellfield B water extraction operations toward
alternative water sources, such as desalination or recycled water, to protect the Basin.
d. Transparent timely reporting of extraction volumes, groundwater pressures and
spring health and monitoring information.
e. Co-governance with Traditional Owners, with investment in cultural heritage
protection and Indigenous Rangers on country.

Conservation SA has sought “a clear safeguard against irreversible damage” in needed closure
of Wellfield A and a phase out Wellfield B, but this Bill fails to do so.

Deputy Premier the Hon Kyam Maher MLC spoke glowingly to the Bill in a Legislative Council 2nd
Reading Speech on 3rd June. Surely, he would have first read the public input from Aboriginal
Native Title bodies, objections from the State Local Voice, and others calling to be heard on the
Bill. As Min for Aboriginal Affairs Mr Maher must hold this Bill off and respect and deliver on the
right to be heard in Public Hearings (e-mail at AttorneyGeneral@sa.gov.au Ph: (08) 7322 7050).

As Treasurer the Hon Tom Koutsantonis MP has finally put monies in the SA Budget for ‘TruthTelling’ – this bad Roxby Bill and draconian new Indenture means there is a lot more truth to tell.

Integrity in public office depends a lot on what the State Labor does next on the Roxby Downs
Bill and new Indenture. This bad Bill must not be rushed unchanged through Parliament by the
end of this June sitting. Public Hearings are necessary so people can be heard and respected in
our society and precious water and Springs must now be protected in this the dryest State.

Further info, see “Roxby Bill rides roughshod over environmental and Indigenous concerns”
at https://www.conservationsa.org.au/protect_mound_springs

Public Submissions to the Roxby Downs Select Committee were belatedly released, see at:
parliament.sa.gov.au/en/Committees/Committees-Detail and scroll to:
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Ratification) Amendment Bill SELECT

The costs of nuclear wastes from “in service” nuclear submarines.

Richard Marles weasels his way out of this problem

3 June 2026 Noel Wauchope AIM Extra , https://theaimn.net/the-costs-of-nuclear-wastes-from-in-service-nuclear-submarines/

It is a rather nauseating entertainment, watching Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles wriggling around to con the public into believing that it will be cheaper for Australia to buy used nuclear submarines, than to buy new ones. I’m not quite sure who invented the new term to replace “used” – but “in service:” is a lovely euphemism, worthy of Marles. Australia’s not buying “used” nuclear submarines – oh no – we’re getting “in service” nuclear submarines.

You gotta admire Richard Marles – he is indeed the master of the weasel word:

“The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretaries welcomed the proposed approach to streamline Australia’s acquisition of Virginia-class submarines (VCS), simplifying supply chain management, operational and maintenance requirements, and maximising cost efficiencies. This approach would enable Australia to acquire three in-service VCS in lieu of a mixture of new and in-service VCS variants.”

“Chasing simplicity is at the heart of why we have pursued this.”

“So firstly, we are paying an amount to the US in terms of its industrial base. That is to create the space for the Virginia-class submarines to be transferred to Australia. But then there is the purchase price in respect of each of the submarines and this will be more cost effective in relation to that and it’ll be significant.”

Work all that out, if you can be bothered.

Anyway, all that doesn’t matter. We know now that (a) these nuclear submarines will be unsuitable for monitoring Australia’s coastline, and really intended for attacking China on behalf of the USA, and (b) will be obsolete by the time we get them, anyway.

But here’s the bit that nobody’s talking about – the “elephant in the ocean.”

Australia is to cop the management of the nuclear wastes in these second hand submarines. Do we know how old they are? Do we know how long before that toxic forever radioactive trash has to buried, or stored in concrete canisters, or what?

And – dare I be so rude as to mention this? What about the costs of disposing of theUSA’s nuclear submarine wastes?

The entire global nuclear establishment is very coy about assessing the real long term or short term costs of nuclear wastes.

France has been working on this since 1991 with its Cigéo project in Bure (Meuse). This project was launched in 1991. Its regulatory process spans decades, with partial commissioning expected by 2050 and a public inquiry in 2026.

On the costs of this project – Wikipedia states:

“Evaluation of the total cost of Cigéo must take into account all the costs of storage over more than 100 years: studies, construction of the first structures (surface buildings, shafts, declines (sloped tunnels)), operation (staff, maintenance, energy…), the gradual construction of underground structures, then their closure, their monitoring etc. Part of these costs/investments will be the salaries of the workforce employed in the digging, construction and storage work, who, according to Andra, will number 1500 to 2000 persons for at least a hundred years.”

The French government has had a bash at estimating these costs:

“A ministerial decree published in France has confirmed the latest cost estimate of the planned Cigéo deep geologic spent nuclear fuel repository at €33.4bn ($39bn) – €37bn including taxes – of which €9.7bn is for initial construction.”

Apart from all the other well-known considerations – safety, danger, terrorism risks, risks of nuclear proliferation, and public opposition, there has been a great reluctance in the nuclear establishment to address the problem of the costs of nuclear wastes.

So Richard Marles can go on, comfortingly bleating about the financial benefits of these second hand nuclear submarines and their second-hand radioactive trash, because as we say in upper class parlance – it’s “just not done” to talk about the financial costs of nuclear wastes.

And now that both Liberal and Labor governments have committed us to taking over American nuclear submarine wastes, will that be the last of it? Are these useless nuclear submarines just the foot in the door for Australia to become the USA’s nuclear waste dump?